Adaptive scaling of reward in episodic memory:a replication study by Mason, Alice et al.
                          Mason, A., Ludwig, C., & Farrell, S. (2016). Adaptive scaling of reward in
episodic memory: a replication study. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology. DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2016.1233439
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/17470218.2016.1233439
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Taylor and Francis
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1233439. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the
publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pqje20
Download by: [University of Bristol] Date: 17 January 2017, At: 03:02
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
ISSN: 1747-0218 (Print) 1747-0226 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pqje20
Adaptive scaling of reward in episodic memory: a
replication study
Alice Mason, Casimir Ludwig & Simon Farrell
To cite this article: Alice Mason, Casimir Ludwig & Simon Farrell (2016): Adaptive scaling
of reward in episodic memory: a replication study, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2016.1233439
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1233439
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
View supplementary material 
Accepted author version posted online: 07
Sep 2016.
Published online: 11 Oct 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 99
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Adaptive scaling of reward in episodic memory: a replication study
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ABSTRACT
Reward is thought to enhance episodic memory formation via dopaminergic
consolidation. Bunzeck, Dayan, Dolan, and Duzel [(2010). A common mechanism for
adaptive scaling of reward and novelty. Human Brain Mapping, 31, 1380–1394]
provided functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and behavioural evidence
that reward and episodic memory systems are sensitive to the contextual value of a
reward—whether it is relatively higher or lower—as opposed to absolute value or
prediction error. We carried out a direct replication of their behavioural study and
did not replicate their finding that memory performance associated with reward
follows this pattern of adaptive scaling. An effect of reward outcome was in the
opposite direction to that in the original study, with lower reward outcomes
leading to better memory than higher outcomes. There was a marginal effect of
reward context, suggesting that expected value affected memory performance. We
discuss the robustness of the reward memory relationship to variations in reward
context, and whether other reward-related factors have a more reliable influence
on episodic memory.
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Memory is limited by constraints such as output inter-
ference, temporal discrimination, source confusion,
and sensitivity to context (Schacter, 1999). It is there-
fore adaptive to selectively encode and retrieve
events in order to remember items that will support
achieving goals (Castel, 2007). A critical question for
memory research is to determine which factors lead
us to remember certain events and forget others.
The status of reward (versus no reward) as one
factor in promoting memory in both incidental and
motivated learning has been established across a
number of studies (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; Murayama & Kita-
gami, 2014; Wittmann, Dolan, & Düzel, 2011; Wittmann
et al., 2005). However, the degree to which small vari-
ations in reward can influence memory is still unclear.
That is, to what extent are more rewarding events
more memorable than less rewarding events?
Non-human primate neurophysiology suggests
that the reward system is responsive to variations in
the magnitude of reward (Schultz, 1998; Tobler, Fior-
illo, & Schultz, 2005). For instance, dopaminergic
neurons in the midbrain appear to respond to predic-
tion error, so that if a smaller than expected reward is
given, the neurons respond below their baseline firing
rate, and if a larger than expected reward is given, the
neurons respond above their baseline (Schultz, 1998).
In this way, neurons respond to changes in reward
magnitude relative to some global expected value
(Schultz, 1998). An alternative form of adaptation,
referred to as adaptive scaling, was suggested by
Tobler et al. (2005), where the increases and decreases
in activity above and below baseline activity remain
constant regardless of the magnitude of the increase
or decrease in reward (equivalent to the sign of the
prediction error).
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Bunzeck, Dayan, Dolan, and Duzel (2010; hence-
forth Bunzeck et al.) extended these findings to
human reward processing. Using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) they first provided evidence
that the reward circuitry in the brain, specifically the
nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), and
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), show adaptive
scaling of reward. Second, in a behavioural exper-
iment Bunzeck et al. linked adaptive scaling of
reward to enhanced memory encoding. Before dis-
cussing the significance of these findings, we briefly
summarize the adaptive reward coding task and the
findings from their initial fMRI study.
Bunzeck et al. conducted a version of the task used
for adaptive reward coding in nonhuman primates
(Tobler et al., 2005). On each trial, a reward cue (a
coloured square) was presented (see Figure 1). The
colour of the cue informed the participant which two
reward values could follow. One cue predicted a high
(£1) or medium (£0.50) reward value; one a medium
or low (£0.15) value; and one a high value or a low
value. The reward values associated with each cue
were presented with equal probability. Participants
then responded by indicating whether the reward
was the higher or lower option associatedwith the cue.
Bunzeck et al. fit three predictors to the blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) data to explain
activity in the midbrain during reward processing.
The three panels in Figure 2 illustrate the qualitative
patterns of possible haemodynamic BOLD responses
to reward for each of the three predictors. The first
predictor, “adaptive scaling”, expresses each reward
value in terms of the cue context and encodes the
reward value as either the higher or the lower of the
two possible reward values, disregarding the actual
reward value (Panel A). In this way, neural activity
associated with a high reward outcome is predicted
to remain constant across actual differences in
reward value. The second predictor, illustrated in
Panel B, refers to the actual value of the outcome,
independently of the context in which the reward
occurs (“absolute coding”). Panel C demonstrates
reward encoding in terms of “linear prediction error”.
This takes into account both the reward value and
the reward cue context. Each reward outcome is pro-
cessed in terms of the difference between the
expected value for a given reward cue and the
actual value of the reward received. The best fitting
Figure 1. Experimental task. Each of the three reward cues (coloured
squares) indicated two possible reward values that would occur with
equal probability. After the reward value was presented, participants
were required to indicate whether they saw the higher or the lower
reward value. A picture of a scene was then presented, which partici-
pants were required to classify as indoor or outdoor in order to receive
the reward. Adapted from Bunzeck et al. (2010). To view this figure in
colour, please visit the online version of this Journal.
Figure 2. One of three possible reward cues (coloured squares) indi-
cated which of two possible reward values would follow with equal
probability. Panels A to C illustrate the predicted blood-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) responses to activity at outcome of reward
based on three models of reward processing: adaptive scaling (A);
absolute encoding (B); and linear prediction error (C). Adapted from
Bunzeck et al. (2010). To view this figure in colour, please visit the
online version of this Journal.
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model was found to be “adaptive scaling” of reward,
meaning that the reward outcomes are processed
relative to the reward context as a binary outcome—
the higher or the lower reward value. This approach
suggests that the reward system is not responding
to reward value, as captured by the predictors “absol-
ute coding” or “linear prediction error”.
The neuroscience of reward processing has
guided research on the relationship between
reward and memory (Shohamy & Adcock, 2010; Witt-
mann et al., 2011). A critical question in the reward–
memory literature concerns the sensitivity of memory
encoding to changes in reward-related properties. In
their behavioural study, Bunzeck and colleagues
directly linked adaptive coding of reward to
memory encoding. The paradigm used in their fMRI
study was extended to include a memory com-
ponent. Each trial of the reward-processing task
was followed by the presentation of a photograph
depicting a scene, and participants responded by
saying whether the scene was “indoors” or “out-
doors”. The picture was presented the next day in
an incidental memory test.
Each picture was effectively associated with a
reward value. Average recognition memory corrected
hit rates were calculated for each of the reward values,
in the three reward contexts. Figure 3 shows that rec-
ognition memory was better for the higher outcomes
than for the lower outcomes across each context. This
was independent of absolute reward value. The critical
evidence for this is the comparison of memory per-
formance for the medium reward value (£0.50) when
it occurred as the higher and as the lower outcome.
The recognition memory rates for pictures associated
with £0.50 presented as a higher outcome were
significantly better than those for £0.50 as the lower
outcome. This study has been cited as evidence that
memory performance is adaptively scaled in line
with the contextual reward values in the environment
(Wittmann et al., 2011), and that a common mechan-
ism controls the midbrain response to reward and its
effects on memory.
The results of Bunzeck et al. demonstrate that
under incidental learning conditions the reward–
memory relationship is sensitive to small changes in
reward magnitude, relative to a context-specific
expected value. However, other incidental learning
studies that have varied reward magnitude have not
seen differences in memory performance across vari-
ations in reward value (Wittmann et al., 2011). In an
incidental memory paradigm, Wittmann et al. (2011)
found a non-linear effect of reward on memory per-
formance, with only significant differences in
memory performance for rewards versus no rewards,
and no further effect of varying amounts of positive
reward. One explanation for this finding is that the
reward system may not have sufficient fidelity to dif-
ferentially respond to similar reward values.
However, this explanation would be at odds with evi-
dence from the primate and human literature
(Bunzeck et al., 2010; Diederen, Spencer, Vestergaard,
Fletcher, & Schultz, 2016; Park et al., 2012; Tobler et al.,
2005).
Wittmann et al. (2011) suggested that their lack of
an effect compared to the finding from Bunzeck et al.
could be due to differences in experimental pro-
cedures. In the Wittmann et al. study, participants
received a single reward cue for each trial and then
positive or negative feedback if the reward was
earned or not. In contrast, Bunzeck et al. focused on
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 2 in Bunzeck et al. (2010), reproduced with permission.
Note: Shading denotes absolute value of reward outcome.
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the reward activity at reward outcome. After a cue and
reward outcome were presented, participants were
required to judge whether or not the reward value
was the higher or lower outcome associated with
the cue they had just seen. Arguably, this requirement
may have served to sharpen the neural representation
of the rewards as the higher or lower outcome, and to
ensure that rewards were processed as values within a
context.
Alternatively, effects of reward magnitude on
memory may also be influenced by reward salience,
as opposed to valence. Madan and Spetch (2012)
have shown a non-linear relationship between
reward value and memory in incidental learning
such that words associated with the highest and the
lowest reward values are better remembered than
those linked to intermediate reward levels. The
authors propose that this finding may be driven by
an interaction between reward value and reward sal-
ience. There is neural evidence supporting this distinc-
tion in reward processing, and the ventral striatum
responds to both these dimensions (Cooper &
Knutson, 2008; Jensen et al., 2007; Litt, Plassmann,
Shiv, & Rangel, 2011), such that there is a stronger
neural response linked to the most positive and
most negative reward values (Cooper & Knutson,
2008). More generally, this is consistent with a predic-
tion error account of reward processing: A partially
signed prediction error model treats appetitive and
aversive events equivalently and is effectively
responding to the presence of an unpredicted signifi-
cant event, and not to whether the event is better or
worse than expected (Jensen et al., 2007). Using
fMRI, Jensen et al. (2007) demonstrated that activity
in the ventral striatum was correlated with a partially
signed prediction error coding the salience, as
opposed to value, of a reward outcome.
The work from Bunzeck et al. has contributed to our
understanding of the relationship between reward
and memory and is often cited as evidence of striatal
contributions to declarative memory (Scimeca &
Badre, 2012; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). To our knowl-
edge, the Bunzeck et al. study remains the only study
in incidental learning to examine the effects of reward
magnitude both in terms of neural correlates and in
terms of behavioural effects. To some extent these
issues have been examined in more depth in the
motivated learning literature. There is a strong body
of evidence in motivated learning demonstrating
that people are able to prioritize high-value over
low-value items in memory. These effects have been
shown using a variety of memory tests including
free and serial recall, and recognition memory
(Adcock et al., 2006; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1982; Harley,
1965; Loftus & Wickens, 1970; Madan, Caplan, Lau, &
Fujiwara, 2012; Spaniol, Schain, & Bowen, 2013;
Wolosin, Zeithamova, & Preston, 2012). Furthermore,
these findings extend to value-based learning where
points are used instead of monetary incentives (Ariel
& Castel, 2014; Castel, 2007; Castel, Benjamin, Craik,
& Watkins, 2002; Castel, Murayama, Friedman, McGil-
livray, & Link, 2013; Friedman & Castel, 2011; Soder-
strom & McCabe, 2011). Taken together these
findings suggest that people are acting to maximize
reward and are able to allocate cognitive resources
during learning so that higher value items are better
encoded than lower value items. The role of value in
memory has important implications for educational
research (Howard-Jones, Demetriou, Bogacz, Yoo, &
Leonards, 2011). This is supported by recent findings
from fMRI studies showing differences in activity in
the fronto-temporal network, associated with seman-
tic processing, during processing of high- and low-
value words (Cohen, Rissman, Suthana, Castel, &
Knowlton, 2014, 2016).
As the above evidence suggests, under different
reward conditions there may be different motivational
processes underpinning the relationship between
reward and memory. Nevertheless, the findings from
Bunzeck et al. along with the suggestion that there
may be a direct mapping between reward processing
and memory performance are often cited in the
motivated learning literature (Spaniol et al., 2013).
The work by Bunzeck et al. has been used as a building
block in our theoretical understanding of the relation-
ship between reward and episodic memory, and
behavioural research has been conducted and inter-
preted in line with their findings (Murayama & Kita-
gami, 2014; Spaniol et al., 2013; Wittmann et al.,
2011). Episodic memory is a critical system for learning
and decision making; one’s current actions and
choices are dependent upon one’s past (Lengyel &
Dayan, 2007; Nairne, 2005, 2014; Shohamy & Adcock,
2010). For example, recent work in the decision-
experience literature has illustrated that people are
biased towards remembering extreme outcomes
(Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2015; Madan, Ludvig, &
Spetch, 2014), and that these memory biases are cor-
related with risky choices. In another study, Ludvig
et al. (2015) showed that priming memories for
recent wins leads to risk seeking, but that priming
losses does not lead to risk aversion. It is therefore
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important to establish the degree to which the
relationship between reward and memory is
monotonic.
Initially we were interested in exploring the poten-
tial role of adaptive scaling in motivated learning. In an
unpublished experiment we began with a direct com-
parison of adaptive scaling in motivated learning and
incidental learning using the Bunzeck et al. paradigm
(see Supplemental Online Material Figure S1). We
failed to find any reward-related effects on memory,
in either incidental or motivated learning. This differ-
ence in findings could have been attributed to
several procedural factors, and we were therefore
motivated to conduct a direct replication of the
behavioural study of Bunzeck et al.
Experimental study
Method
The experimental procedure followed that described
by Bunzeck et al. (2010, p. 1382) and is illustrated in
Figure 1. The experiment was run as four blocks of
72 trials. Each trial consisted of a reward classification
and a picture classification task. In the reward task, a
cue (coloured square) was presented for 500 ms. The
colour of the cue informed the participant which
two reward values could follow. One cue predicted a
high (£1) or medium (£0.50) reward, one a medium
or low (£0.15) reward, and one a high or low reward.
The mapping between reward colour cues and
values was counterbalanced across participants.
After the cue, a fixation cross appeared for 2750 ms.
This was followed by the reward values for 1000 ms.
Participants used the left/right arrow keys to indicate
whether the reward was the higher or lower option
associated with the cue. A photograph was then pre-
sented for a further 1000 ms, after which the fixation
cross appeared for 1875 ms. During this time partici-
pants had to indicate, using the right/left arrow keys,
whether the photograph depicted an indoor or
outdoor scene. In order to maximize stimulus reward
associations, the timings between the cue, the
reward, and the picture were fixed.
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and
as accurately as possible.
Participants earned rewards on the trials where
they correctly classified the reward and the picture.
They were told that they would be paid 10% of all
their earnings, where the maximum possible earnings
was £16. Participants were told they would complete a
similar computer-based task the following day, but
that they would not earn further rewards or
payment during this task. One day later subjects per-
formed a recognition memory test. The 288 previously
seen pictures (48 per reward condition) and 48 new
distractor pictures were presented at the centre of
the screen in a random order. The recognition test fol-
lowed the “remember/know” procedure of Tulving
(1985). Using the left/right arrow keys, participants
had to make an old/new judgment. After “new” judg-
ments, participants were asked to rate how confident
they were about this decision by deciding whether the
picture was “certainly new” or “guess”. After “old”
decisions, subjects were asked to indicate whether
they were able to recollect something specific about
seeing the picture during the study phase “remem-
ber”, or whether they simply felt the picture was “fam-
iliar” or they were guessing that the picture was old
(“guess”). Participants had 4 s to make each of the
two judgments, and there was a break of 15 s after
every 84 pictures. The images used in this study
were the same as those used in the original.
Participants
We had a target sample size of 40 participants (age
range = 18–32 years, mean = 21.3 years, SD = 3.23; 12
males and 28 females). The original paper did not
provide standard errors, and so we were unable to
perform an accurate effect size and power calculation.
In order to determine our sample size, we used the
heuristic that a sample size 2.5 times greater than
the original will allow us to detect a true effect with
a power of approximately 80% (Simonsohn, 2015).
A total of 48 participants were tested. Eight partici-
pants’ data were removed from the analysis for the fol-
lowing reasons: One person did not attend the second
session, three participants’ testing sessions were
incomplete due to technical issues with the network,
and four participants did not respond accurately to
the reward task—either by pressing incorrect
response keys or by not engaging with the task.
These four participants scored below the exclusion cri-
teria (85%) specified in our pre-registration document
(https://osf.io/xsrhj).
Results
The recognition memory analysis was conducted in
line with the analysis in the Bunzeck et al. paper and
is based on a model of recognition memory that
assumes that recollection and familiarity are distinct
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processes (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Recollection
requires recall of contextual aspects of encoding of
the stimulus, whereas familiarity refers to an assess-
ment of stimulus recency, without any contextual
details of recollection (Libby, Yonelinas, Ranganath,
& Ragland, 2013). Participants must classify their
responses to “old” items as either “remember”
responses, where they can identify contextual detail
about the encoding of the stimulus (e.g., whether it
occurred early in the experiment), or as “know”
responses, where they are sure that the item was pre-
sented but cannot recall any additional information.
According to a model of recognition memory (Yoneli-
nas & Jacoby, 1995), the “remember” and “know”
responses are thought to map onto the psychological
dimensions of recollection and familiarity. False-alarm
rates are calculated for both “remember” and “know”
responses. A recollection score (RCorr) is calculated
by taking the proportion of correct “remember”
responses and subtracting false alarms (where a
“remember” response was made to a new item). The
proportion of “know” responses corrected for “know”
false alarms (KCorr), is then used to calculate a famili-
arity estimate, known as FCorr. The familiarity estimate
is equal to KCorr divided by 1 – RCorr. By adding the
RCorr and FCorr estimates together an overall cor-
rected hit rate for recognition memory was obtained
in the same manner as in Bunzeck et al.
During encoding, participants responded quickly
and accurately to the reward task (see Appendix
Table A1 for a summary of the reaction time data). In
the supplemental materials of the Bunzeck et al.
paper the authors report that they conducted a 3 × 2
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on reward-related reac-
tion times (RTs) with the factors reward context
(high–medium; medium–low; high–low) and reward
outcome (higher or lower). They reported significant
effects of reward context and reward outcome on
reaction time as well as an interaction between
reward context and outcome. To summarize their
results, reaction times were fastest for the high–low
reward context, and there was no difference in RTs
between the high–medium and medium–low con-
texts. Bunzeck et al. also found faster RTs for the
higher of two reward outcomes.
We replicated this analysis on our RTs for the
reward classification task and did not find any signifi-
cant main effects or interactions (see Appendix Table
A2). Although no effects in our RT analysis were signifi-
cant, they do appear to follow the same numerical
pattern of faster RTs for higher outcomes. Participants
in our study had lower RTs across the board than those
in the original study, but as the d′ values show in Table
A1, there was no cost to accuracy. Accordingly, our
participants appear to have been engaged with the
task. In line with the original study, we also conducted
a 3 × 2 ANOVA on picture RTs and did not find any
main effects or interactions (see Appendix Table A3).
This is consistent with the original findings.
Figure 4 shows recognition memory performance:
The corrected hit rates for each of the conditions
were lower than those in the original study. Recog-
nition memory was higher for the lower of the two
outcomes in each reward context. Recognition and
familiarity rates, reward context (high, medium, and
low), and relative reward outcome (higher or lower)
were entered into a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA, which found a
main effect of recognition memory type, F(1, 39) =
18.05, p < . 001, h2p = .32, a marginal effect of context,
F(2, 78) = 2.98, p = .06, h2p = .10, and a main effect of
reward outcome, F(1, 39) = 9.50, p = .003, h2p = .20.
There were no significant interactions between any
of the factors: reward context and memory type, F(2,
78) = 0.07, p = .94, reward outcome and memory
type, F(1, 39) = 0.01, p = .92, reward context, reward
outcome, and memory type, F(2, 78) = 0.67, p = .51,
and reward context and outcome, F(2, 78) = 0.56,
p = .64.
Although it did not appear to offer additional infor-
mation over the main effect in the ANOVA, in order to
fully replicate the original analysis we also conducted
a post hoc t test comparing the lower and the higher
reward outcomes (collapsing across context). We
found that memory performance was significantly
more accurate for lower outcomes (M = .15, SEM
Figure 4. Recognition memory performance one day after encoding.
Recognition rates are measured as corrected recognition rates plus
corrected familiarity rates. Error bars show within-subject error bars
calculated using the method in Morey (2008).
Note: Shading denotes absolute value of reward outcome.
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= .01) than for higher outcomes (M = .13, SEM = .01), t
(39) = 3.08, p = .004, h2p = .49.
Our results for recognition performance across
reward cue and outcome do not match the findings
from the original paper. Our results indicate that
lower outcomes lead to better memory performance
than higher outcomes. This pattern is the opposite
of the findings in the original study, where memory
performance was better for the higher of the two
reward outcomes.
Given our marginal effect of reward context, we ran
post hoc Bonferroni-corrected t tests using adjusted
alpha levels of .017 across the three different reward
contexts: high–medium (£1 and £0.50; M = .14, SEM
= 0.02), medium–low reward context (£0.50 and
£0.15; M = .12, SEM = .02) and high–low reward
context (£1 and £0.15; M = .15, SEM = .1). Memory per-
formance did not significantly differ across any of the
pairs of reward contexts: high–medium reward
context compared to the medium–low, t(79) = 2.07,
p = .04, h2p = .46; high–medium reward context com-
pared to high–low, t(79) =−0.34, p = .73, h2p = .08;
high–low compared to medium–low reward contexts,
t(79) = 2.25, p = .03, h2p = .50. These results are weakly
indicative of an effect of expected value on memory,
with better performance under higher expected value.
In line with the original analysis, we ran a t test
comparing the memory performance for pictures
paired with the £0.50 value when it occurs as the
lower reward outcome with that when it occurs at
the higher reward outcome. We found a significant
difference for memory performance associated with
the value under the two different reward contexts,
with memory being better when £0.50 is presented
as the lower (M = .16, SEM = .01) outcome than as
the higher (M = .10, SEM = .02) outcome, t(39) = 2.71,
p = .010, h2p = .61. Again, however, this effect is in
the opposite direction to that of the original.
By replicating the analysis conducted by Bunzeck
et al. we have found effects of adaptive scaling on
memory but in the opposite direction to those
observed in the original study. Given these conflicting
findings, it is important to estimate a graded measure
of the strength of evidence in favour or against the
adaptive scaling hypothesis. A critical question is
what the strength of this evidence is when the data
from both studies are combined. Bayes factors are
well suited to quantify strength of evidence as they
allow the researcher to state evidence in favour of
both the null and the alternative hypothesis (Dienes,
2011; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson,
2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). This evidence is expressed
in terms of the probability of a hypothesis conditional
upon the observed data, and the evidence is not
affected by sample size. Although the strength of evi-
dence for either hypothesis may increase with sample
size, this increase is not biased in favour of either
hypothesis. Finally, for small sample sizes, where it is
hard to differentiate between approximate and exact
invariance, Bayesian statistics allow us to gain evi-
dence for a null effect. This is particularly important
here where we are dealing with small effects and rela-
tively small sample sizes. For these reasons, analysing
both the original data and our data from the replica-
tion study allows us to directly compare the evidence
for adaptive scaling across experiments.
We collapsed across memory type and ran a Bayes
factor ANOVA on the data. We used the Bayes Factor
Package in R to compute Bayes factors (Morey &
Rouder, 2015). This analysis compares a set of more
complex models against a null model that only has a
subject-specific intercept. For the purpose of compar-
ing this analysis to the original, we focused on the
models with reward cue and reward outcome as the
main predictors. If a model containing either reward
context or outcome helps account for variance in
the dependent variable then these models will
perform better than the null model. The Bayes
factors obtained from this analysis quantify the
strength of evidence in favour of each model and
inform us how much of prior beliefs should shift in
response to the data obtained.
According to Jeffreys (1961) we can interpret odds
greater than 3 as some evidence, odds greater than 10
as strong evidence, and odds greater than 30 as very
strong evidence for a particular hypothesis compared
to an alternative (Wagenmakers, 2007). The subscript
of the Bayes factor (“10” or “01”) indicates the direction
of the model comparison: in favour of the alternative
of the null, respectively.
We used the default settings for the priors in the
Bayes Factor Package for R (Morey & Rouder, 2015).
The scale of the effect size (rscale) was set to .707,
which is the “medium” prior. It should be noted that
our results do not change if the narrower or the
wider prior is used. For a discussion on priors see
Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Province and Wagenmakers
(2016).
There was ambiguous evidence regarding an effect
of context (BF01 = 1.14). There was some evidence in
favour of an effect of outcome (BF10 = 4.57), albeit in
the opposite direction to the original result. The critical
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comparison that provided evidence for adaptive
scaling in the original paper was between the £0.50
reward value when it appears as the higher or lower
outcome. Using a Bayesian t test we found some evi-
dence that the recognition memory rates for the
£0.50 in the high reward context was greater than rec-
ognition memory for the £0.50 in the medium reward
context (BF10 = 4.13). Again, this effect is in the oppo-
site direction to the original effect.
The authors of the original study shared their data
with us, allowing us to analyse their data using Bayes
factors for comparison. According to this analysis of
the original data there was some evidence against
an effect of reward context on memory (BF01 = 3.12)
and some evidence in favour of an effect of
outcome (BF10 = 3.57). Again, we conducted a Bayes
factor t test on the critical comparison in the
Bunzeck et al. study: the difference between
memory performance for £0.50 reward outcome in a
high-medium and in a medium-low reward context.
We found inconclusive evidence in favour of the
£0.50, as a higher outcome, leading to better
memory performance than the £0.50 as a lower
outcome (BF10 = 2.21).
Finally, we conducted the same Bayes factor ana-
lyses on the combined data from the original study
and the replication (Rouder, Morey, & Province,
2013; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012),
so there were a total of 56 participants. This com-
bined analysis demonstrated that there was some
evidence in favour of an effect of reward context
(BF10 = 4.25) and inconclusive evidence regarding
the role of reward outcome with similar recognition
memory rates for higher and lower outcomes (BF10
= 1.25). Lastly, we conducted a Bayes t test on the
critical comparison for the combined data set (BF10
= 0.52), which indicated inconclusive evidence
regarding the critical comparison of the £0.50
across the two conditions.
General discussion
Our results do not provide evidence for the sensitivity
of memory to adaptive scaling of reward values as
described by Bunzeck et al. Instead we find some evi-
dence in our data for an effect of lower reward out-
comes enhancing memory performance and a
marginal effect of reward context and therefore
expected value on memory. The effect sizes are rela-
tively small, as is the strength of evidence in the
data as assessed with Bayes factors. Before reaching
any conclusions regarding the differences between
our findings and the original, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether there were any ways in which the
methods employed in our replication differed from
the original.
Our replication was pre-registered, and the regis-
tration form is available on the Open Science Frame-
work (https://osf.io/xsrhj). Furthermore, we
corresponded with the original authors to obtain
details regarding their methods and analysis of their
data. This replication aimed to follow the experimental
procedure set out by Bunzeck et al. as closely as poss-
ible, and we are unaware of any ways in which our pro-
cedure differed from the original. We used the original
stimuli from the Bunzeck et al. paper and all of the
timings followed those in the original study. We
tested a similar cohort of subjects, we kept the age
range of participants the same as those in the original
study, and our participants had a similar (although
slightly lower) average age. Compared to the original,
we did have a significantly higher proportion of
females to males in our sample, but there are no
known gender effects in the reward–memory relation-
ship. In line with the guidelines suggested by Simon-
sohn (2015), we tested a sample size 2.5 times larger
than the original to obtain an expected power of
approximately 80% power in our replication.
In addition to the failure to replicate the memory
enhancement for contextually higher rewards, there
are two further ways in which our data do not
“match” that of the original. Firstly, the recognition
rates in our study were lower than in the original
study, which is surprising given that the images
used and the instructions for the recognition test
were identical. Secondly, we did not see any signifi-
cant effects of reward on reaction time in the reward
classification task in the learning phase. Numerically,
participants in our study had lower RTs across the
board than in the original study; however, the accu-
racy was overall very similar in the two studies (see
Supplemental Material Table S1). Although there is
some evidence that rewards may influence response
vigour (Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007), we are not
aware of any a priori, theoretical reason why a behav-
ioural effect of reward on memory would be contin-
gent upon differences in reward-related RTs.
Accordingly, although previous studies in the reward
memory literature have found faster reaction times
for high than for low rewards (Adcock et al., 2006; Witt-
mann et al., 2005), there is no reason to expect that the
magnitude of the reward effect on memory depends
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on the magnitude of the reward effect on RT. In
addition, any overall differences in RT may be attribu-
ted to differences in the lab settings, equipment used,
the participant pool, or a combination of these factors.
We therefore do not think that our failure to replicate
this finding, or our faster average RT, can explain our
lack of evidence for adaptive scaling effects on
memory.
Our calculation of the strength of evidence in the
original study, combined with our effect size esti-
mates, indicates that the effects of adaptive coding
of reward on memory are relatively small. Therefore,
our failure to replicate this finding could be due
simply to the small and fragile nature of the effect:
Some studies (especially when the sample size is
small) will fall on the “right” side of p = .05, and
other studies will not. Indeed, computing a more
graded metric of evidence in favour of adaptive
scaling in the form of Bayes factors, it is clear that
there is some positive evidence in favour of an
effect, albeit in opposite directions, of relative
reward outcome (lower vs. higher) in the original
study and in our study. Therefore, when we combine
the data from both studies, the evidence is ambiguous
(Bayes factor close to 1). For the more the critical com-
parison of the medium reward (£0.50) in two different
contexts (one in which the medium reward is rela-
tively low and one in which it is relatively high) a
Bayes factor analysis suggests that the original evi-
dence for an effect was weak (Bayes factor around
2). In our study, the evidence is stronger (Bayes
factor around 4), but again in the opposite direction.
Across studies in the reward–memory literature
there is substantial variability in the reward–memory
effect, including factors such as the exact manner in
which reward cues and outcomes are presented,
paired with stimuli, and the expectancy of participants
(incidental or motivated learning). Given that we are
often dealing with small effect sizes, it is important
that there exists a true record of attempts to look at
the conditions under which different reward–
memory related effects occur. This will help establish
the size of the effect and in this case the necessary
and sufficient conditions under which adaptive
scaling of reward influences memory encoding. It is
possible that others have failed to observe such
effects, especially as reward-related effects are rela-
tively small, and one goal of this paper is to ensure
we do not contribute to the “file drawer problem”.
Our failure to replicate could in part be due to med-
iating factors in the reward–memory relationship. In
this case, a potential role of performance-related
anxiety has been suggested to us by the original
authors (Dayan & Bunzeck, personal communication,
February 18, 2014). Previous research indicates that
the reward–memory relationship is in some instances
mediated by performance anxiety, in particular where
reward is dependent on the to-be-remembered items
(Callan & Schweighofer, 2008; Murty, LaBar, Hamilton,
& Adcock, 2011). These findings are more relevant to
the motivated learning literature, where a participant’s
memory performance determines their earnings. In
the current study, during the encoding phase partici-
pants are unaware of the memory component to the
task. In addition, participants were very accurate in
performing the adaptive scaling task. Having said
this, any element of performance-related reward
could have induced anxiety and therefore may be
worth controlling for in future reward-related
memory studies. If this is the case, it remains unclear
as to why this did not influence findings in the original
study. Furthermore, there is the possibility that other
individual difference factors such as personality or
genetics could contribute to the variability in results
(Krebs, Schott, & Düzel, 2009; Wittmann, Tan, Lisman,
Dolan, & Düzel, 2013). However, at this stage there is
no evidence to suggest that these factors mediate
the reward–memory relationship (Wittmann et al.,
2013).
It is important not to over-emphasize the potential
contribution of hidden or unknown moderators.
Beyond those possible moderators mentioned above
there are also many others, for example the chance
that experimenter-specific effects affected either our
study or the original. However, if such incidental fea-
tures of the experimental settings could be respon-
sible for completely flipping the pattern of results,
then the incidental effects are clearly stronger than
the underlying effect of interest. If that were the
case, it would suggest that the paradigm used here
(and in other studies) is not suited to assess the
robust operating characteristics of the systems that
link reward to memory. Another alternative, of
course, is that the difference in results between the
studies is attributable solely to sampling variability.
Not only did we fail to replicate the original find-
ings, we actually found some evidence of an effect
in the opposite direction. Interestingly, there is pre-
vious evidence in the reward–memory and decision-
making literature that negative outcomes can
promote memory performance (Madan et al., 2014;
Murty, Labar, & Adcock, 2012). Aside from their role
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in positive motivation, dopamine neurons are also
thought to indicate non-rewarding but salient events
and even aversive events (Bromberg-Martin, Matsu-
moto, & Hikosaka, 2010). Murty et al. (2012) found
that mean recognition rates were significantly
greater for pictures paired with the threat of punish-
ment. It is possible that in our replication the lower
of the two outcomes was seen as an adverse
outcome and was processed as a punishment, thus
leading to better memory performance. Incidentally,
Murty et al. (2012) note that the overall recognition
rates in their study were lower than in their work on
reward and motivated learning (see also Adcock
et al., 2006). Considering the present experiment in
isolation, these punishment type effects may also
explain our lower recognition rates in this replication.
Furthermore, it has been shown that across a range
of positive reward values, the most positive and the
most negative values lead to better memory perform-
ance (Madan & Spetch, 2012). Madan and Spetch
(2012) propose that a model containing both reward
value and reward saliency best explains memory per-
formance. Moreover, it has been suggested that the
divergent effects of reward value on memory across
the literature can be explained by interactions with
the salience, arousal, and priority processing of
stimuli (Clewett & Mather, 2014). The data from this
experiment cannot easily be explained by a theory
of reward salience. If reward saliency referred to the
outcomes in each reward context, we would not
predict a difference in memory performance linked
to the higher and lower reward outcomes. In contrast,
if the term is applied across all values in the exper-
iment it would be expected that the mid-range
£0.50 reward value would be less salient and would
consistently lead to lower memory performance. In
contrast, our data do show some (albeit weak) evi-
dence of contextual effects of reward on memory pro-
cessing, with lower reward outcomes leading to
enhanced memory performance. However, this may
be an artefact of the current experimental design,
which was not intended to test the influence of
reward salience on memory.
There is existing evidence that suggests that
reward outcome is a critical factor in the reward–
memory relationship (Mason, Ludwig, & Farrell,
2016). Mather and Schoeke (2011) examined the
effects of reward anticipation and outcome on inci-
dental memory encoding. They found there was a sub-
stantial effect ( h2p = .23) of reward outcome in both
recognition and recall memory tasks, where memory
performance was better for trials resulting in a “hit”
outcome (this included both loss avoiding and
rewarded trials). The authors argue that the critical
factor is therefore outcome relative to expectation,
as opposed to absolute amount of reward. Our replica-
tion adds weight to this evidence and highlights the
importance of reward outcome effects in memory per-
formance, and we find that relatively lower than
expected outcomes appear to improve incidental
memory.
Although there is substantial evidence of adaptive
scaling of reward in the brain (Bunzeck et al., 2010;
Diederen et al., 2016; Park et al., 2012; Tobler et al.,
2005), the evidence regarding a direct mapping of
reward processing patterns in the brain and memory
is far from conclusive. It is important that theories
relating to dopaminergic consolidation go beyond
looking for a direct relationship between dopamine
activation in the brain and memory performance. For
example, in a series of studies in motivated learning
(Mason, Ludwig, & Farrell, 2016), we have found no
relationship between reward uncertainty, as encoded
by tonic firing rates of dopamine neurons (Fiorillo,
Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, &
Quartz, 2006), and memory. It thus appears that
other reward-related factors, such as reward
outcome, determine memory processing above and
beyond those mapping specific neural firing patterns.
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Appendix. Reaction time analaysis
Table A1. Reaction times for correct responses and d′-values.
High–medium Medium–low High–low
Reaction time task
£1
(RT)
£0.50
(RT) d′
£0.50
(RT)
£0.15
(RT) d′
£1
(RT)
£0.15
(RT) d′
Picture RT (ms) 461 (46) 500 (35) 500 (50) 460 (46) 466 (47) 462 (46)
Reward RT (ms) 509 (51) 516 (5) 516 (52) 507 (51) 502 (50) 514 (51)
4.20 (1.87) 4.45 (1.86) 4.24 (1.52)
Note: RT = reaction time. Numbers in parentheses denote one standard deviation.
Table A2. ANOVA results for the reaction times to the rewards in each
condition.
Measure F df p
Reward context 0.069 2 .934
Reward outcome 0.166 1 .684
Context × Outcome 0.302 2 .740
Note: ANOVA = analysis of variance.
Table A3. ANOVA results for the reaction times to the pictures in each
condition.
Measure F df p
Reward context 0.244 2 .784
Reward outcome 0.147 1 .702
Context × Outcome 0.012 2 .988
Note: ANOVA = analysis of variance.
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